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THE VERBAL INEBRIATE AND LUNATIC
FRINGE IN PENOLOGY
By Henry B. Babb of the Denver Bar
ISRAELI once said of Gladstone, "He is intoxicated
with the exuberance of his own verbosity."
The groggy cerebration of the verbal inebriate is
our theme. A bewilderment of words! Why not? By a
misfitted initial word a momentous thought may be deflected
afield, or catapulted in air. It is believed that this accounts
for the grotesquely missed objectives of some wonderfully
adroit wielders of words. Else how is it that in current criminology starkest cruelty awakens tenderest solicitude for its
perpetrator only? Why tenderest pity wholly for the pitiless?
Novel and astounding words that split the ears of the groundlings withal, and jar to dislocation the benevolent aims and
purposes of their users.
Some years ago in North Denver a brother and sister
fifteen and sixteen years old, were playing on some ice that
had formed in an excavation near their home. A stranger
came upon them and murdered the boy with an axe that he
had brought for that purpose, his main purpose being to outrage the girl-which he accomplished.
Reformed modes of approach to the solution of such antisocial acts are,-Ascertain the antecedent behavioristic manifestations of the actor; or if he was the victim of an impelling
inferiority complex; or more likely, the evil prepotency of a
more or less remote ancestor may be identified as the real
culprit.
If these postulates lack technical accuracy of statement,
they are not comparatively fantastic, as will appear later.
The Literary Digest of October 26, 1929, discussing the
proceedings of the International Congress of Pyschologists,
meeting at Yale University, relates:
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"Prof. Barnes said, as he is quoted in the press, 'There is a quarrel to
the death between psychiatry and conventional criminal law-that procedure
based upon the theory that the criminal is a free moral agent and should
receive a definite measure of punishment for a specific crime. The jury
should be replaced by an examining board of psychiatrists, which would
determine the treatment desirable in each individual case. The judge would
be reduced to the status of a formal supervisor of the process'."

That challenge is accepted by this article.
An equally advanced reform urged by an advocate
equally eminent in another alien field, is the following:
"I can vision the coming of a practically crimeless world through the
advancement of clairvoyance. We shall have a clairvoyant in every police
station and there the criminal will be hunted down so that crime will become
the most difficult, if not impossible, action to conceal. Clairvoyants will
often be able to tell the actual perpetrator of the crime.
If you give them a portion of the dress of the slain person, they frequently will be able to throw themselves back to the time of the killing and
get a kind of intimation of the circumstances and the method used by the
criminal." (Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.)

This quotation is also from a press report. The same is
true of other quotations, without specific citation. However,
the better authenticated quotations will show that no substantial misrepresentation is chargeable to the Press Reports.
Passing from the master of detective literature to his
more aggressive rivals, the question naturally occurs, what do
the latter propose. This is clearly stated in the New York
World by a prominent criminal lawyer:
"Punishment is always wrong. It brutalizes those who inflict it and
those who receive it. There is only one motive for it, and that is revenge, in
which there can be no justice, for it is based on hatred, which is degrading.
That punishment is not much of a deterrent is clear from the fact that our
prisons are full of repeaters and that spectacular crimes are followed by
imitations, and the idea of reformation is equally absurd. Man works according to his structure. He never reforms, because he can not. His intrinsic
character is fixed.
All of which does not change the fact that society must defend itself
against the criminal--sometimes against the saint-whether it is worthy of
defense or not. But all we need to do is to isolate the offender. In fact,
that's all we can do."

In other words, society of questionable worthiness is
flagrantly malevolent, and thus far the law-breaker is the better of the two.
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That the lawyer's statement of the new doctrine is not
influenced by professional bias will appear from further
quotations.
At page 756, Vol. 51, Rep. Am. Bar Assn., an eminent
psychiatrist incorporated in his paper read to the Association,
a report of a committee of the American Psychiatric Association, which persons interested should read. For lack of space
the following is excerpted:
"3. That crime as well as other behavior and characterologic aberrancies can be scientifically studied only by those properly qualified-scientists
who have made it their life interest and study to understand and treat behavior disorders. * * *
"7. That this point of view requires certain radical changes in legal
procedure and legislative enactment, insuring the following provisions * * *
(b) The elimination of the use of the hypothetical question and the terms
'insane' and 'insanity' and 'lunacy', etc. (c) The exemption of the psychiatrist from the necessity of pronouncing upon intangible concepts, in which he
has no interest, concern or experience, such as 'responsibility', 'punishment'
and 'justice'."

Here is frankly stated the point of divergence between
these scientists and old-fashioned folk who think, with
Edmund Burke, that justice is the greatest concern of mankind. Their proposed substitute was presented in a series of
articles in the World's Work Magazine, July, August and
November, 1925. The writer says:
"Crime is caused by a defect of the brain. This defect renders its victim so far below normal in emotion as to make him literally irresponsible.
* * * The emotionally sub-normal man is much more dangerous, because he
is so quiet that he is seldom suspected until after he has committed a crime,
and because his type comprises nearly one hundred per cent of all criminals.
This discovery has provided a rational and consistent explanation of every
kind of crime, from petty larceny to murder." (Note the one hundred
per cent.)
*

*

-*

*

*

"(2)
Emotional insanity is incurable.
"(3)
Emotional insanity can now be positively diagnosed and accurately measured.
In the light of this new knowledge, we cannot 'punish' people for irrational acts; we cannot hope to reform people who are incurably irrational.
What then can we do?
First, humanize our penology by abolishing our prisons. These barbarous cages of stone and steel are relics of our old ideas of punishment. In
their place provide guarded farm colonies, where these pathetic victims (for
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that, in truth, is what they are) of their physical inheritance may live a
dvilized life safe from the temptations of the world, and where they cannot
further molest society."

This writer says that all criminals have a "defective
affectivity", the result of a defective mind.
"This means, literally, that there is a structural defect in the tissues of
the lower brain. In 89 cases out of every hundred the defect is inherited.
Every human being has two minds-not in any mystical sense, but literally.
One is the upper part of the head, or cortex. With this gray matter we
reason. This is the thinking mind. The other mass of gray matter is the
feeting mind. It is the base of the brain.
These are the only two functions of the mind that can concern crime,
emotions and the will. All crimes come from a defect of the lower mind,
because conscious acts require the exercise of the will, and improper acts are
from improper emotions."

An actual case illustrating this principle is at hand. An
Ohio lady brained her spouse with a hammer because he
opposed her going to a bridge party. She burned her bloodbespattered garments in the furnace, went to the party and
apparently enjoyed it. A distinguished psychoanalyst of
Cleveland explained that the homicide was due to a split
personality, and therefore "an accident resulting from the
mastery of Mrs. West's unconscious mind over her normally
conscious state."
So it goes. These privileged people, whether of mind or
personality, have a bifurcated makeup, so that in case of
homicidal misadventure, culpability slips somewhere between
and disappears.
The writer of the magazine article in the November issue
of World's Work says:
"The emotional types correspond roughly to types which on the side
of intelligence we call respectively moron, imbecile and idiot."

Thus implicitly assuming, as proof by analogy, that the
part of the criminal class other than the emotionally insane, is
made up from those types, moron, imbecile and idiot. In
other words, that it is an established fact that criminal conduct is the result of mental defect or deficiency of which the
criminal is the irresponsible victim. Time was when this
ignorance might have been winked at, but not since the World
War and the Army mental tests.

DICTA

Prof. Carl Murchison, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology
in Clark University, in his exhaustive work on Criminal
Intelligence, at page 32, says:
"'In the light of the discussion in this chapter and the preceding one, it
seems fairly obvious that the pre-war prevailing opinion that criminality and
feeble-mindedness are closely related, was certainly not built upon a solid
foundation of collected facts. The progenitors of this theory are not to be
condemned on that account. There were no existing norms of general intelligence in the civil population. Until those norms should be formulated,
no examination of criminals alone could reveal why criminals were more
or less feeble-minded than the general population."

And in a preliminary summary of pages of tabulated
data, carefully gathered by applying the Army tests to hundreds of prisoners in half a dozen penitentiaries, he says:
"That is, the criminal element of society, as will be shown by the facts
reported in this book, does not possess a lower average intelligence than the
civil population, assuming the Army norms and the civil norms here reported
to be equally representative enough for the purposes of this discussion. This
is well substantiated by the report in Volume 15 of the Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, 1921. On page 800 a comparison of 3368
criminals at Ft. Leavenworth, with 94004 cases of the sample of the army,
shows that the criminals have the advantage in Alpha scores." (Alpha
scores throughout the book is synonymous with intelligence.)

The author says at page 50:
"Not a single state in America sent a draft quota that could compare
mentally with the criminals born West of the Mississippi and confined in
eastern prisons."

He says that this may be the result of factors not necessary to be discussed here. All that is important is that the
criminal mentality at least averages in every way with that of
the law-abiding. This is in accord with common sense conclusion from ample opportunity for observation.
Lewis E. Lawes, for many years warden of Sing Sing
Penitentiary, in August 1928 World's Work Magazine says:
"It is now known to all leading scientists, sociologists and criminologists,
that law-breakers are just as normal or abnormal as those that keep the law,
and that the born criminal type does not exist and never has existed."

The same in substance is said by John G. Grooms, for
five years warden of the East Penitentiary of Philadelphia,
in a late issue of the Saturday Evening Post. He adds-
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"The criminal comes from all types and classes."

Such was the opinion of Henry Starr, notorious bank
bandit:
"There is no more a science of criminology than there is a science of
eatology, or drinkology, or lawyerology, or carpenterology. You say the
criminal has certain wheels in his head that lead him to be always a criminal
in spite of all efforts to reform him. You might as well say a carpenter has
certain cogs in his brain and bumps on his nut that make him build houses in
spite of all efforts to get him to do something else. Bunk! We all know
a carpenter can quit that game any time he wants to. So can the criminal
quit his game, and they do."

In effect, the first quoted World's Work writer practically coincides with these views, and on page 395 of the August
number says:
"On the other hand, a considerable majority of the law-abiding, Godfearing human race grade no higher than high grade moron intelligence.
Indeed, the good-natured moron is the backbone of civilization. He does
nearly all the useful manual labor. He does the tasks that do not require
initiative or invention or extraordinary will power. He earns his livelihood,
is a good neighbor and presides over most of those centers of wholesome
thought, genial companionship and abiding affection that we call home."

For which, thanks I And let it be added with all the
spirit of which the class is capable, that as a factor in the
normal progress of the social order, dull people are greatly
undervalued. We impede the swift innovations of hectic
genius. We wear the meretricious theory and the theorist to
a frazzle in his futile effort at its demonstration.
Dr. Murchison, at page 27 says:
"Probably no man ever lived who was not mentally defective in some
way.

The familiar, "All excepting me and thee, and I sometimes think thee is queer", expresses the popular recognition
of the same truth. The psychopathic laboratories that report
such startling discoveries of "physical defect of the mass of
gray matter composing the basal ganglia and the nervous system" wholly fail to report that their diagnoses have included
any part of the law-abiding, concededly normal population.
Whatever the variant behavior of these ganglia may be, if it
is not demonstrated to be peculiar to the (criminal) "charac-
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terologic aberrancies" which it is supposed to produce, such
symptoms are utterly valueless as proof of the correctness of
such supposition. In other words, if it is not shown that the
same alleged anomalous functioning of these organs is nonexistent among the uninteresting, law-abiding population,
who are without such "aberrancies", the assumed truth is not
only unproved, but becomes ridiculous and the fine theory
explodes itself.
Quoting the World's Work writer more fully, he says
at page 390 of the August number:
"The new psychologists know exactly what degree of abnormality he is

affected with, and they know that his affliction-for it is just that-is a
physical defect of the gray matter, comprising the basal ganglia and the
nervous system."

One would suppose that such scientific cock-sureness
would be a finality, but a writer in a later number of the same
magazine, June 1930, says:
"If forty or fifty per cent of the world's criminals are gland madewhich the doctors now believe to be the case-then defective glands are without ouastion the largest cause of crime."

In other words, not the intelligence and telegraph system, but the organs of secretion of the human frame play the
dickens with its normal functioning.
The last article mentions "disturbance of the gonads"
with well-known obvious physical consequences. Barring the
technical term, universal human experience supports the
gland theory in this particular, to a reasonable extent. In
fact, morbid sexicologists seem just now to be winning the
day in so-called scientific circles, and sex is chiefly the basis
of Freud's Psychoanalysis.
It seems that anybody can make almost any statement and
advance any theory regarding biological agencies and functions, without conclusive challenge, because there is so much
that nobody knows. And we are not yet convinced that we
should abolish our prisons and by pure love and affection cure
the law-breaker of his evil ways.
The annual roll of murders in the United States, by a
reliable authority is said to number about 12,000. Any reader
who has been neighbor to a family to whom the dead body of
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a murdered husband, father and breadwinner has been
brought home, will remember a scene something like this,-A
distracted wife, terror-stricken children, and in many cases a
hopeless outlook for the future. In the domestic catastrophe,
not interested. But the red-handed murderer is a "pathetic
victim", to be tenderly cared for in a farm colony and caressed
into social adjustment.
In Midsummer Night's Dream, lovesick Titania, under a
temporary spell, lavishes her affections on an ass. She could
not-hold a light to the amorous attainments of these scientists.
And they demand that the courts be reduced to the function of
mere supervisors of the process of translating these "pathetic
victims" from the temptations of a cold and cruel world to the
Elysian conditions above mentioned. And abolish juries
altogether.
The merit of this demand is illustrated by a quotation
from a Denver paper dated more than two years after the trial
therein mentioned:
" 'He cannot live a year!' This was the unanimous verdict of five leading Denver alienists who examined Orville J. Turley, murderer of Mrs.
Emma G. Wise. They so testified in Turley's trial. * * * Turley spent a
short time in the penitentiary hospital after his conviction, grew fat, and
learned to play the saxophone. Friday night, with two other members of
the penitentiary band, he made his escape at Hugo, Colorado, and is now at
large."

It will be observed that the contention here opposed is,
that all criminals are psychopaths, and therefore little attention is herein given to such as are actually so afflicted.
Dr. Chase, in his book "The Ungeared Mind" (1900),
says that the average percentage of insane in this country is
one in 350 of the urban, and one in 500 of the rural population.
Louis E. Bisch, M.D., Ph.D. whose "job is psychiatry",
reports in the Saturday Evening Post, June 12, 1926, from the
psychopathic laboratory of the New York Police Department,"The approximate number of daily arrests was 623. Of this number
29 cases, or roughly five per cent. were considered candidates for mental
examination, and of these 21 were found to be distinctly abnormal. * * *
They were persons whose reasoning, memory, judgment, and other faculties
were affected to such a degree that efforts at reform would be fruitless, un-
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less they were placed in a special institution and given special and individual
care and attention."

Note that the five per cent are the kind of offenders most
likely to be caught. This would greatly reduce the percentage
as to the whole bqdy of crime.
An instruction to a jury by a Denver trial court and approved by the State Supreme Court, reads as follows:
"On the subject of insanity the court instructs you as follows: 'A
person who is so diseased in mind at the time of the act as to be incapable of
determining right from wrong with respect to the act, or, being able to so
distinguish, has suffered such an impairment of mind by disease as to destroy
the will-power and render him incapable of choosing the right and refraining
from doing wrong, is not accountable; and this is true howsoever such insanity may be manifested, whether by irresistible impulse or otherwise. But
care should be taken not to confuse such mental disease with moral obliquity,
mental depravity or passion, growing out of anger, revenge, hatred, or other
motives, and kindred evil conditions, for where he is induced by any of these
causes the person is accountable to the law'."

Compare this with the eminent English author of the article on psychiatry in the 2nd Sup. to the Brittanica, II Ed.:
"A man is regarded as insane who, on account of mental disease no
longer thinks, feels and acts in accordance with the usages and customs of
the society to which he belongs; and is not held responsible for his behavior
if he does not know at the time the nature and quality of his acts."

The instruction above quoted is a free paraphrase with
concrete application, of the statements of principles by the
last two quoted psychiatrists. Our "quarrel to the death",
therefore, is not with the men of highly enlightened and enlightening intelligence, whose professional assistance, at times,
is so necessary to certitude in the administration of justice, but
such quarrel is with the Roosevelt fringe of the same profession who disdain the "intangibles of insanity" "responsibility"
and "justice". It is here submitted that they have disqualified
themselves as competent witnesses in any court of justice. In
fact, Judge Kavanagh includes them in the title to his very
useful and readable book "Criminals and their Allies."
Then why this protest? Because these reformers have
quite overwhelmed popular attention by their vociferation and
muddled popular understanding to the extent that the alert
politician is inclining his ear as to a possible vox Dei.
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Thus far, ordinary amenities of controversy have required
that the profession of our adversaries be taken at their own
valuation. The following from those who ought to know is
respectfully submitted:
"There is chaos in the science of psychology. Psychologists have no
agreement among themseves about the fundamental laws that govern learning
or the formation of human thought and habit.

They disagree as to what these laws are; what the problems are which
they intend to solve; what their importance in the science is, and whether
the laws governing the thought processes are the same or different from those
governing the formation of conduct. Having discarded the old laws, each

modern psychologist who undertakes to write a book formulates his own
laws." (Prof. Homer B. Reed, of Pittsburgh University.)
"'There are few words so loosely used as psychology. There are few
claims of science so insecurely founded as the claims of psychology. There
are few men of science so cocksure, so invasive, so 'go ahead before you are

sure you are right' as psychologists." (Dr. Joseph Collins, Past President,
Neurological Association; Founder of the Neurological Institute.)

If this is true of psychology, how much more true of psychiatry, the ology of the disordered mind. The term has its
inherent perils. Its twist of orthography, tortuous pronunciation and consequent quirk of concept, naturally teeters the
highly sensitized mental balance of the all-philanthropist. It
is this scheme of nebulous nebulosity that is to control the
decisions-not of life and death-but whether charged murderers, rapists and burglars shall be set at large or cared for
in a farm colony so long as "they continue dangerous."
But it cannot be denied that the new cult contains more
than a modicum of truth. For instance, there is much in the
doctrine of heredity; but how much in a given case? Whence
the many-sided greatness of Abraham Lincoln. Some guess
that it was from his unknown grandfather. But it is only a
guess. So in any case it is a guess, at least as to the relative
dominance of heredity over other factors. But if it were more
surely ascertainable, what of it?
In the case of The People v. Rattlesnake, the plea of
heredity is undeniable, but no good; and the further plea that
his emotions are wholly malignant by nature, is true enough;
but so much the worse.
So in the case of The People v. Tiger. The defense of
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"defective affectivity" or congenital no conscience, admitted
but unavailing.
Society in its right to protect itself, denies the validity of
such defenses. So it does when like human types of cruelty
are at the bar of justice, and insisis on individual, not ancestral,
responsibility.
But it is said that punishment does not deter. That it does
deter when it is swift and sure, as in England, every one knows,
but the comparative efficiency of the administration of justice
in England and the United States is another story.
In conclusion, the foregoing animadversions relate exclusively to the "fringe" mentioned in our caption, well-meaning
folk who are "intoxicated with the exuberance of their own
verbosity."

NOTICE
A combined index of the five volumes of The Denver
Bar Record and of the first three volumes of Dicta, will appear in the next issue of Dicta. If you have saved your copies
of either the Record or of Dicta, then watch for that index
and save that index for future reference.
Also, if you are not saving your copies of the Record,
please look over your shelves for any stray copies you may
have, and mail them to Dicta.

DICTA'S FORERUNNER
By Roger H. Wolcott*
F Dicta is unique among law reviews it comes by it honestly, as successor to The Denver Bar Association Record.
The first number of Dicta was dated November, 1928, and
was entitled Volume VI, Number 1, in recognition of the fact
that The Denver Bar Association Record had been published
for five years, the date of Volume I, Number 1 (which appeared in November) being December, 1923.
There are doubtless many complete files of Dicta extant,
but there are few publications in the legal field whose files
have become more rare than those of The Denver Bar Association Record. One reason perhaps is that Volume I, Number 1
and several other opening numbers consisted largely of notices
of coming meetings of The Denver Bar Association, reports of
recent meetings, and copies of the treasurer's report and of
committee reports. Some of these were of ephemeral concern,
and the recipient of the Record might well have failed to
realize the future very human and unusual little monthly into
which it was to develop.
Credit for founding 'and establishing The Denver Bar
Association Record goes to Jacob V. Schaetzel, who at the
time and for some years was Secretary-Treasurer of the Denver Bar Association. The interest eventually aroused by the
publication of such a bulletin at monthly intervals did much
to make possible the present day effective organization and
activity of the Association, which has become a model among
bar associations.
It is only three years since the Record (at the urging of
Henry W. Toll) burst its chrysalis to become Dicta, but in
view of the fact that so few, if any, of the law offices in Denver
now have complete files of the Record, it may be of interest
to speak of its make-up and thereafter to record here at least
a partial list of the articles which appeared in the Record's
pages, many of Which were models of brevity and succinctness.
The publication was frankly for the purpose of printing
notices and items for the advancement or entertainment of the
*Dean of Law, University of Denver.
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Association, and there was space in each issue for only a
limited amount of legal comment. The Record made no effort
to cover the field of a law review and did not pretend to fulfil
the functions of a review. It was just the kind of informal
local publication that every member of the Association would
stop to peruse, even when it was received along with a sizeable
delivery of business mail.
The first four numbers consisted of four pages each, and
then the bulletin was expanded to eight pages. Volume II
Number 2, in February, 1925 was 19 pages, and from that
time on the eight-page publication frequently appeared with
additional pages. In months when there was no occasion for
the larger size the publication went back to eight pages.
In June, 1925, with Volume II, Number 6, Mr. Schaetzel
resigned as Secretary-Treasurer and was succeeded by Albert
J. Gould, Jr. The 13 numbers of Volume I appear to be entirely the work of the Secretary-Treasurer, but in Volume II,
Number 3, dated March, 1925 appear the names of the earliest
Editorial Committee, made up of Joseph E. Cook, Richard
H. Hart, and Peter H. Holme. In April, 1926, with Volume
III, Number 4, the Record began appearing in 16 pages, with
a blue cover instead of the former white cover. The familiar
blue cover continued until the Record gave place to Dicta
two years and a half later. The pages of the Record were six
by nine inches at all times, and contained two columns, as compared with Dicta's seven by ten page and single column. The
type in the Record was smaller than in Dicta.
Volume I, Number 1 of the Record announced on its
cover the luncheon meeting of December 3, 1923, with Henry
McAllister, Jr., as speaker, on the subject of "Federal Receiverships". The inside pages contained reports of the
Treasurer, the Membership Committee, the Committee on
Women and Children, the Judiciary Committee, the Memorial
Committee and the Library Committee.
Number 2 reported the "J. Ham Lewis meeting" of
December 24, 1923, and among other articles contained one
on "System in a Law Office" and one on "Revision of Supreme
Court Rules", both anonymous.
Number 3 announced plans for the forthcoming bar pri-
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maries of April 7, 1924 and contained a signed article on
"Workmen's Compensation Law" by W. F. Mowry.
Subsequent numbers continued along similar lines, nearly
every number expressing a hope on the Secretary's part that
members would hasten to pay their dues. One such item contained the promise that the ensuing number of the Record
would contain a complete list of "members in good standing",
hut the threat was not carried out. A list of members was
finally published two years later, in August, 1926, apparently
without ulterior motive.
Among articles appearing in Volume I were "Lawyers'
Fees" by Luke J. Kavanaugh, "America's Challenge to the
Legal Profession" by Omar E. Garwood, "Lawyers' Fees" by
S. S. Large and "Can Lawyers be Honest?" by George Q.
Richmond (happily answered by him in the affirmative).
Among articles in Volume II (calendar year 1925) were
"The Present English System of Pleading" by John H. Denison, "Assignment of Trial Cases" by Hudson Moore, "A
Curiosity of Litigation" by Edward Ring, "Law as Administered in England" by Henry H. Clark, "Thomas Jefferson,the Lawyer", by Albert G. Craig, "The First Hundred Years"
by Bryan L. Whitehead, "The Law-Abiding Lincoln" by
Charles A. Murray, "American Law Institute" by Wilbur F.
Denious, "Minimum Fees" by L. B. Johnson, and a poem,
"The Final Judgment", by Rees D. Rees.
In Volume III (1926) we find "Edward 0. Wolcott,Wit" by Edward Ring, "The Government as Guardian", by
James A. Marsh, "Quickening the Memory" by Henry A.
Dubbs, "A Municipal Court for Denver?" by George A.
Trout, "John Knowles" by Edward Ring, "The Enforceability
of Criminal Statutes" by Joseph C. Sampson, "Protected by
Statute" by L. F. Twitchell, "Not Guilty", by Robert E.
More, "A Romance from the Year Books" by John H. Denison, "A Forgotten Celebrity" by Charles S. Thomas (referring
to Thomas M. Bowen), "The Young Lawyer's Problems" by
Horace N. Hawkins, "The Torrens Law" by B. M. Webster,
"Tax Sales and Tax Titles in Colorado" by John F. Mail,
"Verbal Leases" by Jesse H. Sherman, "Real Estate Title Insurance" by Golding Fairfield, "The Making of an Abstract"
by Mrs. Minnie H. Oakes, "Title Insurance Problems" by
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Herbert Becker (of Chicago), "The Business Man and the
Law" by Charles C. Butler, "A Purposeful Tale" by L. F.
Twitchell, "Building and Loan Associations" by Luke J.
Kavanaugh, "The Federal Estate Tax Lien" by George T.
Evans and "Reflections on the- General Property Tax" by
Victor A. Miller.
Volume IV (1927) contains the following: "Inheritance
Taxes,-The Present Situation in Colorado", by Leroy
McWhinney, "Revaluation of Property in Denver for Purposes of Assessment" by Clem W. Collins, Assessor, "Loose
Business" by Carle Whitehead, "Reason is the Soul of Law"
by Robert E. More, "Comments on Supreme Court Practice"
by John T. Adams, "The District Court" by Charles C.
Sackmann, "Mr. Jarndyce in the Twentieth Century" by
Wayne C. Williams, "An 18th Century Graft" by James H.
Teller, "In the Legislative Green Room" by Henry W. Toll,
"A Discourse on Pleading" by John H. Denison, "Recent
Statutes" by Henry McAllister, Jr., "Re: Colorado River
Waters and the Santa Fe Compact" by Fred S. Caldwell,
"The Posthumous Song of a Calf" (poem) by Harold W.
Perry, "The Constitution and Dynamic Sociology" by Victor
A. Miller, "Municipal Bonds" by Myles P. Tallmadge, "General Sherman" by W. J. McPherson, "Redeeming the Bar"
by Jacob J. Lieberman (of Los Angeles), "Some Legal
Aspects of the Colorado Coal Strike" by Edward Miller.
The fifth and final volume (January to October, 1928)
contains "Attachments in California" by Jacob J. Lieberman,
"Canadian Justice" by J. P. O'Connell, "Why Our Government and Our Constitution?" by Carle Whitehead, "What's
Wrong with the Law" by Bethuel M. Webster, Jr., "Corporate Mortgages and Reorganization Under Foreclosure" by
W. M. Bond, and "Statutes of Limitations in California" by
Jacob J. Lieberman.
This list makes no mention of addresses delivered before
the Association by its members and by others, and reprinted
in whole or in part in the Record, including addresses by
Roscoe Pound, R. E. L. Saner, Silas Strawn, and Nicholas
Murray Butler. Each number of the Record sparkled with
news items and with jokes arising locally or clipped from
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contemporaries, and of a proper length to fill the interstices
between longer articles. A news item of the August, 1924,
number was to the effect that the Colorado Supreme Court
had cleared its docket, in June, 1925, it was announced that
attorneys in Denver numbered 889, while members of the
Association totalled 639, a great increase in membership within a few years' time, in September, 1925, the founding of "The
Jealous Mistress" was noted, to be the official organ of the
Colorado Bar Association, and in December, 1925, an account
was given of the address by R. Hickman Walket on "The
Follies of 1925", which, with the date moved up a couple of
notches each time, has become an eagerly awaited biennial
event in the Association. In January, 1926, began the department entitled "Recent Trial Court Decisions", which was
continued through the remaining issues of the Record. The
Editorial Committee at the time of the final number of
Volume V was Cass M. Herrington, Chairman, Victor A.
Miller, Sidney Moritz, Jr., and Rodney J. Bardwell, Jr. To
show that the Record had not changed too greatly from its
earlier numbers, an issue as late as May, 1927, opened with
an eloquent ultimatum addressed by Albert J. Gould, Secretary-Treasurer, to members who had become delinquent in
payment of dues.
In view of the fact that Dicta has devoted itself each
month to the tasks in hand and has not previously paused to
comment at any length upon its geneology, it may be permissible to include now in its pages this record of ancestral activity
and accomplishment. Credit is due and the story should be
preserved, even if it be only in outline form.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF
COMMERCIAL LAW
By C. Clyde Barker of the Denver Bar
HE origin of Commercial Law, or the Law Merchant,
as it is frequently called, clearly grew out of the customs and usages of merchants.
While it may have existed in a more or less loosely defined state prior to the Christian era, at the same time it owes
its greatest original impetus to the cities of Northern Italy
beginning with the 9th century as pointed out by Charles
Henry Huberich in his introduction to the work entitled "The
Commercial Laws of the World".
After sketching the advantages enjoyed by these cities as
favored by geographical position and certain political and
economic events, and their extensive commercial relations
with Byzantium and the Moslem states and the resultant rise
by Venice to the status of a World market, the strife for commercial supremacy between Pisa and Genoa, Sienna and Milan, and the becoming in the 13th century by Florence of a
great manufacturing city and later the banking center of
Europe and the chief rival of Venice, Mr. Huberick proceeds
to trace the development of commercial law as affected by
these activities as follows: "The rise of the merchant guilds
with their corporate right of legislation in respect to their
own members, and the right to exercise jurisdiction over them
created a large body of statutory and customary law binding
on special classes."
The Law of a particular guild frequently differed from
that of other guilds in the same city.
The unification of the commercial law was achieved
chiefly by combination of several merchant guilds into a large
guild, in turn vested with the usual powers of legislation and
jurisdiction. Those by-laws of the constituent bodies which
had proven of practical utility were, by reason of their adoption by the general guild, given a wider application and finally recognized as of binding force even when opposed to the
general law of the State.
The jurisdiction of the guild courts was gradually ex-
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tended so as to be applicable not alone where the litigant parties were merchants belonging to the guild, but also in other
cases.
Foreign merchants, as well as persons who had ceased to
be merchants, and the heirs of merchants, were in respect of
commercial transactions, subject to the jurisdiction of the special courts.
Finally jurisdiction was assumed in commercial cases between traders and non traders, and in general there was a
tendency to assume jurisdiction upon the ground of the
character of the parties and of the character of the subject
matter.
Procedure in the Commercial courts was summary, expeditious and free from the forms of pleading and technicalities of evidence. The decision was based not on strict rules
of Law, but on principles of equity.
It was the adoption of this body of substantive and adjective commercial law, free from the restrictions of the old Roman, Canon and feudal law that marks the beginning of modern commercial law, and which has so profoundly influenced
the legal institutions, not alone of the continent of Europe, but
also of England, and through the latter, the law of the United
States. Its influence has not been confined to the domain of
commercial law, but has extended to the civil and public law.
It was a new force to break down the formalism of older
systems, and to bring them into accord with the new social and
economic conditions.
It is interesting to trace the spread of the Law Merchant
in England, its subsequent development there, and its influence
on and ultimate assimilation into the Common Law of England.
This development was marked by three distinct stages.
The first one may be fixed as ending at the appointment
of Coke as Lord Chief Justice in 1606. Prior to that time, the
Law Merchant constituted a special law administered by special courts for a special class of people. It remained distinct
as a separate body of law, and this arose of necessity out of the
business of merchants and traders. Thus we find Sir J. Davis
was caused to,remark that until he "understood the difference
between the Law Merchant and the Common Law of England.
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he did not a little marvel what should be the cause that in
the Books of the Common Law of England, there ought to be
found so few cases concerning merchants and ships; but now
the reason was apparent, for that the Common Law did leave
those cases to be ruled by another law, the Law Merchant,
which is a branch of the Law of Nations."
To administer this Law, commercial courts were set up,
principally the courts Fair, courts of the more important
towns, and courts of the staple. In all these tribunals, as in
the case of the guilds of Northern Italy, the chief object aimed
at was expedition, and in none was justice meted out with
greater celerity than the courts of Fair, otherwise known as
the "Court of Pied-Poudre or Pi-Powder" taking its name
from the French meaning the "dusty foot", signifying dustyfooted dealers and itinerant merchants to whom justice was
administered while the dust was still on their feet, or before it
could be shaken off, an expedition in the matter of' justice
against which it is thought our most clamorous present-day
complainants against the Law's delay could register no just
complaint.
We find Coke referring to this Court as follows: "This
Court is incident to every Fair and market because that for
contracts and injuries done concerning the Fair or market,
there shall be speedy justice done for advancement of trade
and traffic, as the dust can fall from the feet, the proceeding
being from hour to hour."
These courts sat both in the forenoon and in the afternoon
to distinguish their sessions from the-King's court whose judges
sat only from 8 to 11 in the forenoon, and spent the remainder
of the day in consultation in chambers. Their contemplative
faculty did not set well with the merchants, who, being men
of action, required justice to be speedy.
The second stage of the development of the Law Merchant commenced with the term of office of Lord Coke as
Chief Justice in 1606, and according to Mr. Scrutton in his
"General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant", lasted
until the time when Lord Mansfield became Chief Justice in
1756, and during that intervening time the peculiarity of its
development is this-that the special courts die out and the
Law Merchant is administered by King's courts of Common
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Law, but is administered as a custom and not as a law, and at
first the custom only applies if the plaintiff or defendant is
proved to be a merchant; and it was the habit to leave the
custom and facts to the jury without any directions in point of
law, with the result that cases were rarely reported as laying
down any particular rule because it was almost impossible
to separate the custom from the facts.
And as a result during this period very little was done
towards building up any system of Mercantile law in England.
An instance of the dissatisfaction experienced in thus attempting to administer the Law Merchant in Common Law
Courts was found in the criticism thereof by Malynes in His
"Lex Mercatoria, or Ancient Law Merchant" wherein after
commending the Law Merchant as being always constant and
permanent, he directs at the Common Law the following
thrust: "In chancery every man is able, by the light of Nature, to see the end of his cause and to give himself a reason
therefor, and it is therefore termed a cause; whereas at the
Common Law, the client's matter is called a case according
to the word 'casus' which is accidental, while a party doth
hardly know a reason why it is by law adjudged with or against
him."
Lord Mansfield was dissatisfied with its conditions, and
upon assuming the Chief Justiceship in 1756 set about his
great abilities to its improvement. How he did this cannot be
better stated than by Scrutton in his essay on "Roman Law
Influence", "This Lex Mercatoria had therefore a Roman
Foundation, and the importance of this will be seen when we
remember that Lord Mansfield, the father of Modern Mercantile Law, during the thirty-two years in which he was Lord
Chief Justice of the King's bench, constructed his system of
commercial law by molding the findings of his special juries
as to usages of merchants which had often a Roman origin on
principles frequently derived from the civil laws in the law of
Nations." One among Junius' attacks on him expressly alludes to this feature of his: "In contempt or ignorance of the
Common Law of England, you have made it your study to
introduce into the Court where you are presiding maxims of
Jurisprudence unknown to Englishmen, the Roman code, the
Law of Nations, and the opinions of foreign civilians are your
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perpetual theme". A charge for which, says Lord Campbell,
there is not the slightest color of pretense. He did not consider the Common Law of England a perfect code adopted to
the expanded, diversified, and normal requirements of a civilized and commercial nation, but in no instance did he ever
attempt to substitute Roman rules and maxims for those of the
Common Law. He made ample use of the compilations of
Justinian, but only for a supply of principles to guide him
upon the questions unsettled by prior decisions in England,
deriving also similar assistance from the Law of Nations and
modern continental codes.
The nature of his work was well described by Buller,
Justice, in his celebrated judgment in Lickbarrow v. Mason
where he says, concerning bills of Lading, "Thus the matter
stood till within these thirty years, since that time commercial
law in this country has taken a very different turn from what
it did before. Before that period we find that in the courts
of Law all the evidence in mercantile cases is thrown together;
that they were left generally to a jury, and they produced no
established principle. From that time we all know that great
study has been to find some certain general principles-not
only to rule the particular case then under consideration, but
to serve as a guide to the future. Most of us have heard these
principles stated, reasoned upon, enlarged, and explained till
we have been lost in admiration at the strength and stretch
of the human understanding. And I should be sorry to find
myself under a necessity of differing from Lord Mansfield
who may truly be said to be the founder of commercial law of
this country."
It is interesting to note the relations between Lord Mansfield and the special juries he trained for use in commercial
cases as found set out in Campbell's "Lives of the Lords Chief
Justices".
(To be continued in October issue)
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SAYS YOUI

SAYS ME!

"A lawyer's office may, also, and in times like the present many doubtless are, very private and quiet and undisturbed places at all hours."

Parker

vs. State, 26 Tex. 207.

WOULD HE HAVE SPLIT THAT INFINITIVE
"The statute itself was drawn by a person whose ability to use the English language so as to accurately and correctly express the thought intended
to be conveyed is not excelled by that of many present-day writers." Krueck
v. Phoenix Co., 157 Wis. 276.

WELL, WHAT OF IT?
"There is a fair average of perjury in this case, but we can not tell on
Standard Brewery Co. v. Nudelman, 70 Ill. App. 356.

which side."

VERY SWELL POESY
The true lover of the divine art expressed in iambic tetrameter, or blank
verse, or what have you, may bathe his soul in a mixed metaphor of joy by
examining Van Kleek v. Ramer, 62 Colo. 4, 44. Or, if you are a West addict,
consult 156 Pac. 1108, 1121.

AND THESE IN TURN HAVE SMALLER
(LESSER?) FLEAS, AND SO
AD INFINITUM
"An Act to amend an Act entitled 'An act to amend an Act entitled
"An Act to amend an Act entitled 'An Act to regulate commerce', approved
February 4, 1887, and All Acts amendatory thereof, and to enlarge the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission'," approved March 4, 1915."
No. 183, 64th Congress.

VITAL AND ALSO INCOMPREHENSIBLE
"The distinction between the two is that the writs in these cases stated
the wrong name of the right party while the writ in the case under consideration states the right name of the wrong party. This distinction is vital."
Surace v. Pio, 112 Me. 500.
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COMPARE ROSSI V. COLORADO PULP
AND PAPER CO.*
"If the Chief Justice labors under the impression that this decision will
be followed by any number of people, how.ever small, as a moral guide, he had
best be undeceived. In view of the great length of our opinions in this case,
but few, not excluding lawyers, will ever read them, and, if we shall keep
on adding installments, none will ever have the time to do so. The only real
effect of this decision will be upon the appellants and the Harrisons, and they
won't care to read it." Frick, J., dissenting in Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah
632. 110 pages, boys.

THE ARKANSAS MANNER OF DISSENT
"It is well that the court has so plainly labeled the contract in this case
as one for the lending of money; otherwise it would never be recognized as
such." Siphon Co. v. Hutton, 116 Ark. 563.

THE TEXAS STYLE OF THE SAME
"The opinion of Judge Harper herein is the severest blow to the enactment of valid laws regulating the use, handling, dealing in and sale of intoxicating liquors, and their enforcement, that has ever been rendered by this
or any other court." Lonymire v. State, 75 Tex. Crim. 639.

THE NORTH DAKOTA METHOD
"Since the foregoing dissent was prepared, a concurring opinion has been
written by Justice Goss for the conceded purpose of discussing the dissenting
opinion. This procedure is, to say the least, somewhat anomalous, as I believe the books will be searched in vain for another instance where a majority
has found it necessary to defend its decision, and I sincerely hope that this
procedure will not be followed by this court in the future. This extraordinary proceeding is of itself an admission of the weakness of the conclusions
reached by the majority members, and a confession on their part that their
former opinion needs defense. I shall not attempt to go into any extended
discussion of the concurring opinion, as the opinion itself is a sufficient refutation of its contents." Goss, J., dissenting in Fox v. Nelson, 30 N. Dak. 589.

THE ENGLISH PREFER THIS
"I have the misfortune to differ from Lord Justice Cotton, and I do so
with a deep sense of the probability that he is right." Bowen, L. J., dissenting In re Haseldine, 31 Ch. D. 511.
*299 Pac. 19.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EniroR's Nor.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

WILLs-LIFE ESTATES-Walton v. Wormington, et al.-No. 12857.

Facts.-Henry Wormington by will left all of his property to his children, except one piece, and as to this piece of property, he left the income to

his children. Provision was made that if any of the children died, leaving
issue, the issue were to take the interest of the deceased parent, but that if such
child died without issue, the interest was to go to the remaining children.
The question to be decided here is whether, under the will, one of the
testator's children took a fee simple, or merely a life estate to the income. If
the former, the widow of the deceased child is entitled to one-half of one-fifth
of the estate, and each of his children, the legatees, are entitled to one-sixth of
one-fifth of the estate. If the latter view was taken, each child was entitled to
one-third of one-fifth.
Held.-"The law does not sanction the creation of a life interest in. the
income of an estate devised in fee to the same persons, because a devise of real
estate in fee includes as a necessary incident thereof the absolute right to the
income therefrom perpetually. The attempted creation of a life estate in the
income being inconsistent with the devise in fee and, in affect, a restraint upon
alienation, is void."-ffirmed.

SALES LIQUIDATED DAMAGES DURESS OF PROPERTY Moise Brothers Company v. Jamison-No. 12487.
Facts.-Complaint states two causes of action:
1. On a draft.
2. On an agreement for the dismissal of a suit.
The draft, which was dishonored upon presentation, having been given
for the dismissal of the suit, only one of these causes need be considered.
Defendant bought 610 steers from plaintiff in 1922. Under the contract
certain defective and undesirable animals were to be excluded upon the instructions of the defendant. Defendant's agents found upon examination that
few of the cattle complied with the agreement. Arrangements were made for
plaintiff to take 174 head, for which was paid a total of $4754. Under the
contract a penalty of $2.80 per head, or $1240.80, for the cattle bought but
not delivered, is the amount plaintiff seeks to recover.
After defendant had put 174 head in transportation, plaintiff threatened
him with a replevin suit, and to prevent this suit, defendant gave the draft in
question under protest. The lower court held for the defendant and plaintiff
alleges error.
CONTRACTS -
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Held.-Plaintiff was short in supplying cattle under the contract. Because of this, plaintiff would not be entitled to recover the penalty provided
for. The draft in question, having been given under duress of property,
was of no value.-A4ffirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-CHANGE OF VENUE-Hopkins v. The People-No. 12863.

Facts.-Hopkins was convicted of embezzlement, and alleges as error,
among other things:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Denial of motion for change of venue.
Denial of motion for mis-trial.
Admission of improper evidence.
Remarks and comments of the trial judge in the presence of the jury.

Held.-1. Although plaintiff's application for a change of venue was
supported by affidavits, neither party challenged any of the jurors for cause.
"This remarkable circumstance, in itself, would clearly indicate that defendant's fears of prejudice were unfounded."
2. Counsel's motion for a mis-trial was based upon the fact that one of
the jurors, after all defendant's peremptory challenges had been exhausted, was
Subsequently counsel learned of previous statements
accepted by counsel.
made by the juror concerning the defendant's guilt. The juror when being
examined, however, stated that he could give and would give a fair and impartial trial. The showing made on the motion was insufficient.
3. The evidence complained of was that of the Certified Public Accountant. Objection was made that testimony of an accountant cannot be introduced without the consent of his client. Though the stdtute so provides, it
was not shown that the accountant was ever in the employ of the defendant.
4. The remarks of the court which were objected to were in nowise
prejudicial to the defendant's interests, these remarks being made by a court
only to the objections of counsel, and an examination of the record does not
show them to be prejudicial.-Afirmed.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONTRACTS OF-CONSTRUCTION OF-PROFESSIONS-ARCHITECTURE-PRACTICE BY CORPORATIONS--Johnson-Olmstead
12322.
Realty Company v. City and County of Denver, et al.-No.
Facts.-Plaintiff, as a tax payer, seeks to attack the contract of the city
with the Allied Architects, Inc. The case was submitted to the court on an
agreed statement of facts. The contract to the Allied Architects was let without competitive bidding, and the Allied Architect is a corporation. The question was whether this contract was valid. The lower court held the contract
to be valid, and the realty company alleged error.
Held.-1. Although to the charter provision demanding competitive
bids on all contracts entered into by the city, an exception is recognized in
contracts involving professional services, yet the contract in question was not
exclusively one for professional services, and competitive bidding should have
been entertained in accordance with the charter.
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2. A corporation under the existing Colorado statutes is not qualified to
practice the profession of architecture. "We do not wish to be thought to
say that the legislature may not permit the granting of licenses to corporations,
but to say that we are of the opinion it has not done so."
The dissenting opinion by Justice Butler:
1. The legislature did not contemplate that competitive bidding after
advertisement should be necessary in the employment by the city of any person who is to render services calling for special skill, knowledge, or experience.
2. The statute provides that "any corporation * * * engaged in the
planning or supervision of the erection * * * of buildings for others * * * shall
be regarded as an architect within the provisions of this act, and shall be held
to comply with the same." Another section of the statute forbids any corporation to practice architecture without a licence. The Board of Examiners
pursuant to statutory authority, had empowered corporations to practice as
architects when each and every member thereof is a licenced architect. This
corporation having fully complied with all provisions of the statute, should be
permitted to practice architecture.-Reversed.

EXECUTIONS-PROCEEDINGS IN AID OF-[alkerv. Staley-No. 12856.

Facts.-Judgment against Walker for $769.51. Application was made
by Walker to declare the judgment fully satisfied. To this application the
court made an order that judgment be declared satisfied to the extent of $200.,
the original obligation having been secured by a Chattel Mortgage, and the
$200. having been realized from the sale of the property. Under supplementary proceedings, an order was given, appointing a receiver of property,
found by the court to belong to Walker.
Held.-1. The order declaring the judgment satisfied to the extent of
$200. was proper and is affirmed.
2. (a) Of the property found there were accounts to be collected by
Walker, and upon which he had not yet earned his commission. "The
contingent fees were unearned * * * contingent fees not yet earned are not
subject to a receivership and cannot be reached in proceedings supplementary
to execution.
The sale of the property found by the court to belong to Walker
(b)
was real estate in his wife's name. "The court had no power to order the
receiver to take possession of the property and sell it without first granting to
Mrs. Walker her day in court." "Where title to real property claimed to
belong to a judgment debtor stands in the name of another, a creditor's suit is
the proper proceeding to subject the property to the satisfaction of a judgment."-Reversed in part and affirmed in part.

County Commissioners-No. 12503.
Facts.-The county commissioners purchased a right of way over the
plaintiff's land, and agreed in addition to paying the purchase price of $300.COUNTIES-CONTRACTS OF-Langton v.
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1. To replace all fences.
2. To replace flumes.
3. To take care of and maintain a flume and ditch.
Plaintiff sues defendant for failure to comply with these three provisions
of the agreement. Among other things,. plaintiff alleges loss of crops, cost of
reseeding, loss to a wooden flume because of non-use.
The court below gave judgment for the plaintiff upon the verdict of
$393.32, plaintiff alleged error.
Held.-The county is liable not only for the disturbance to the plaintiff's
land, and for its failure to replace the ditches, etc., but also for any loss of

crops, which were occasioned by defendant's failure to abide by its contract.
-Reversed.
AUTOMOBILES-DAMAGES-COLLISION-RELEASE-

No. 12404 -Yelloway,

Inc. vs. Garretson-DecidedAugust 10, 1931.

Facts.-Garretsonrecovered judgment in Court below for $1,000.00 for
personal injuries incurred while riding as a passenger in bus of defendant
when bus collided with an automobile.
Held.-I. Where assignments of error fail to set out number of court's
instructions complained of or otherwise identify them and where abstract contains none of the instructions given or requested, such assignments will not be
considered.
2. Where assignments of error fail to refer to the folio numbers of the
record where rulings and exceptions appear, such assignments based on objections to the evidence will not be considered.
3. Court will not consider error in refusing to grant a new trial where
no particular error is specified.
4. Refusal to grant non-suit cannot be urged where defendant proceeds
with trial after non-suit is denied.
5. The relation of passenger and carrier existed under the facts of this

case.
6.

The driver of the bus was negligent.

7. The question of the validity of the release signed by plaintiff was
properly submitted to the jury.-Judgment affirmed.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-PRINCIPAL BOUND

BY AGENT'S ACTs-FORCIBLE

DETAIER-Nordlander vs. Wood, et al.-No. 12228-Decided Aug. 3,
1931.
Facts.-Nordlander brought suit to recover possession of certain real estate and for damages for the detention. Judgment for defendants below.
Held.-Where the owner of real estate appoints an agent for the handling of the real estate, the owner is bound by the agent's acts apparently within the scope of his authority, even though the agent acts contrary to his instructions and even though the agent withholds material facts that he should
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have communicated to his principal, where the third party with whom the
agent deals had no notice of the agent's limited authority.-Judgmentaffirmed.

12465-Lutz v. Becker-Decided
July 6, 1931.
Facts.-In an action for conversion, judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff. Defendant alleges error on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment. Defendant had foreclosed a Chattel Mortgage on personal property. With the property taken by the defendant on the
foreclosure, was some which was admittedly that of the plaintiff. Defendant
had, however, co-mingled the plaintiff's property with his own. Plaintiff
introduced evidence tending to prove that defendant forbade plaintiff from
going on his premises to pick out the property.
Held.-When the important evidence before trial court is disputed the
finding by that court, when there is sufficient evidence to support it, will not
be disturbed upon review.
Dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
"Not every act of interference with the owner's right to personal property is conversion."
The failure of the owner to properly identify his own property, would
not make the defendant guilty of conversion.-Judgment affirmed.
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COURT REPORTING - DEPOSITIONS - PLEADINGS - INQUESTS - MEETINGS
Residence Telephones: FRanklin 1193 and YOrk 7286

410 E. & C. Buildind

DENVER

Telephone TAbor 3040

Dignified, well-engraved stationery is a
nirk

of the mman who believes in Limmself.

THE W.

H.

KISTLER STATIONERY CO.
MAIN 5161

AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
ACCURATE AND DEPENDABLE ESTIMATES FURNISHED

PROMPT, COMPLETE REPAIR SERVICE
Twelve Years Dependable Service Has Caused Many Leading Denver Law Firms to Entrust
to Us the Inspection, the Estimate, the Repairs, and Re-conditioning
of Wrecked or Stolen Cars

HARRISON MOTOR1S, ic.
2031 Stout Street

DENVER

Phone KEystone 2341

DICTA

Compliments of

Brown Palace Hotel
THE W.
1550

H.

COURTRIGHT PUBMSHING Co.

GLENARM PLACE

-

MAIN

6448

-

DENVER

LAW BOOKS
COMPLETE STOCK NEW AND SECOND-HAND BOOKS
AND LIBRARIES FOR COLORADO LAWYERS

SAVE MONEY

LEGAL .4DIERTISING

Notices, Reports, Form Letters

The Daily Journal

MULTIGRAPHED
.0

MI.EoGR

ALL

IFOR

By Having Your

EFFICIENT SERVICE

BY

MUTUAL
MULTIGRAPHING
CO.
ZELIN
1,Igs.302
ROS.
ZELKIN BROS.,
Mgrs.

EFFII
E ERICE
KITTREDGE BUILDING
KEystone 4969

710 KITTREDGE BLDG., DENVER

HERBERT PAIRALL

TAbor 6725

AND

JAMES E. GAULE.

PUBLISHERS

Quick Service-Moderate Prices

REGISTERED ATTORNEY U. S. AND CANADIAN PATENT OFFICES

R. H. GALBREATH
PATENT ATTORNEY
U. S. and FOREIGN PATENTS, TRADEMARKS and COPYRIGHTS
TELEPHONE TABOR 0425
Denver Theatre Buildind

DENVER

154 Glenarm Street

